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I. The Time Aggregation Problem in Applied Systems Analysis
A. Introduction
Assumptions regarding the aggregation of time stream data
(e.g. "discounting") are crucial in the evaluation of regional
development proposals and the assessment of environmental impacts.
Nonetheless, present practice reflects a great deal of confusion,
ambiguity, caprice, and downright error in the calculation and
implementation of such assumptions. We present in this paper
the outlines of an approach to inter-temporal indicator evaluation
for use in the analysis of regional development alternatives.
Our ultimate objective is pragmatic: We wish to develop a
practical framework for the reduction and comparison of time
stream data for evaluation of public programs and policies. As
a foundation for this approach, however, it has been necessary
critically to review the existing controversy on intertemporal
aggregation in a public policy context, and to clarify the
practical implications of the, points at issue. Three inter-
related themes pervade this review and provide a conceptual
focus for the work.
1) The determination of rules for intertemporal indicator
evaluation properly constitutes a public policy question. Market
behavior is one source of public opinion on which such decisions
should be based, but only one. The ballot box and the public-
ly responsible administrative body constitute similarly leg-
itimate channels for the expression and articulation of relevant
op1n1on. The "sensibility" of such opinion should doubtlessly
be considered through evaluation of their implications but it is
ultimately the opinions, not the sensibility, upon which time
aggregation rules are to be founded.
2) The time stream aggregation problem is essentially a
distributional problem. The impossibility of intergenerational
transfer payments obviates all solutions based on Hicks-Kaldor
or less restrictive welfare criteria, and calls into questions
the applicability of the entire Ramsey-cum-von Neumann utilitarian
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outlook for matters of time aggregation. Related considerations
are introduced through recognizing the inability of future gen-
erations to express themselves through either today's market or
ballot box.
3} The unknown is the dominant ｦ ｡ ｣ ｴ ｯ ｾ of the ｩ ｮ ｴ ･ ｾ ｴ ･ ｭ ｰ ｯ ｾ ｡ ｬ
evaluation equation. Given the inherent unpredictability of
the future, time stream aggregation procedures must address
explicitly the uncertainties in both project impact projections
and future preference assumptions. The fact of irreversability
and the concept of option value are central in this context,
and must likewise be addressed effectively.
B. The Importance of Time Stream Aggregation Assumptions in
Project Evaluation
The treatment of intertemporal indicator aggregation
problems is a dominant factor in the evaluation of alternative
public policy programs. At stake in these assumptions is nothing
less than the distribution of economic activity between the
private and public sectors and, less directly, the allocation
of consumption and choice opportunities among present and
future generations.
The stream aggregation assumptions, usually though not
necessarily embodied as a compounding percentage discount rate,
are often the most sensitive aspect of the entire evaluation
analysis. In one study, Fox and Herfindahl (1964) reevaluated
178 water resource development projects undertaken in 1962 by
the u.s. Army Corps of Engineers. These projects represented
a combined initial investment of over 3 billion dollars, and
were all characterized by benefit/cost ratios greater than or
equal to 1. when evaluated at the prevailing prescribed discount
rate for federal project costs of 2 5/8%. Fox and Herfindahl
reevaluated the projects at discount rates of 4, 6, and 8% and
found that the project adoption decision was reversed (i.e.
the newB/C ratio dropped below I.) for 9, 64, and 80% of the
investment, respectively. Similarly powerful cases for the
dominating influence time stream aggregation assumptions may
-3-
be found in Baumol (1968), Krutilla (1969) and Koopmans (1974).
Furthermore, conservationists and environmental protection
advocates have frequently called for lower social discount rates
as a means of reducing rates of resource exploitation. The
likelihood of counterproductive results of such a proposal
(see Scott 1955, and below) in no way lessen its significance
as an indication of the perceived relevance of time aggregation
rules in project evaluation and analysis.
c. The Present Lack of a Defensible Rationale For Time Stream
,
Aggregation
Given the importance of time stream aggregation assumptions,
it is alarming to find that no reasonably defensible rationale
presently exists for the discussion and specification of such
assumptions. The most obvious symptom of this lamentable state
of affairs is the extreme spread in published recommendations
for the "social" discount rate to be used in evaluating public
projects. Baumol for instance, cites a range of 4 1/2 to 9%
(Baumol 1968), and Hirshleifer and Shapiro (1969) document
seven different studies suggesting rates from 2 1/2% to 13 1/2%.
In light of the sensitive relationship between discount rates
and benefit/cost ratios in the Fox and Herfindahl analysis, this
sort of variation is all the more alarming.
But if a wide spread of published time aggregation factors
is disturbing, it is not particularly surprising. For although
most economists agree that a proper representation of the
"opportunity cost of postponement of receipt of any benefit
yielded by a public investment" (Baumol 1968, pg.788) is central
to the time aggregation issue, there is gI·eat disagreement as
to just what this means in practice. In particular, various
arguments flourish as to the relevance of market indicators
and imperfections; bank and government interest rates; the degree
of project riskiness; private versus "public" goods (sensu
Samuelson 1954); and assumptions concerning future population
growth, technological capabilities, and preferences. Different
estimates· of opportunity costs and time preference rates emerge,
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depending upon the particular treatment of these matters adapted
in a given analysis. Furthermore, underlying the technical
debate there exists a radical disagreement regarding the norm-
ative social welfare models most appropriate for use in inter-
temporal allocation problems. These various normative assump-
tions again tend further to promote differences in time aggre-
gation recommendations. We shall discuss detailed aspects of
both the technical and ethical issues subsequently, but the
thrust of our argument may be usefully summarized at the ouset.
D. The Need For a New Approach to the Time Problem
Intertemporal social welfare decisions are too important
to be left to the economists. States have been founded "to
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves, and our posterity",
by explicitly participatory political means. Ethical and
religious systems provide a variety of strong precepts regarding
our responsibilities and prerogatives to time future and gener-
ations unborn. Optimal market models governed by efficiency
criteria also have implications for these matters, but they have
no preordained right to monopolize the field.
Particularly unjustifiable in this respect is the seemingly
ubiquitous, slavish, and uncritical adherance to a Fisherian
interest rate model as the ultimate arbitrator of social time
preference decisions (see Fisher 1930, and a critique by
Feldstein 1964). Even if this model's assumptions of perfect
markets and perfect competition could be met in practice, its
social acceptability would be questionable because of its failure
to address distributional equity questions. But the market seg-
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mentations, imperfections, and uncertainties characterizing the
present economy leave the model badly crippled in any case, as
the frantic patching and shoring activity of its own advocates
so clearly demonstrates.
A dispassionate review of the present literature can only
lead one to conclude that time aggregation assumptions - again,
most often embodied as a compounding percentage "social" dis-
count rate - have become little more than a free parameter in
the project evaluation equation: a parameter uncritically ad-
justed to accomodate worries about anything from risk (Frost
1971) to bias (Bain et al. 1966), to option values (Fisher and
Krutilla 1974), to growth projections. The real criteria for
the form and magnitude adjustments seems to be little more than
)
one of plausibility of the evaluation results. Implicitly
saddled with an inappropriate evaluation model we seem unable
to reject, and convinced on intuitive or experiential grounds
of the plausibility of certain evaluation outcomes, we are
treated to the sorry spectacle of professional economists indis-
criminately loading the discount term with sundry paraphernalia
until the evaluation answer comes out "right". The correctness
of the answer is then - mirabile dictu - passionately and
seriously defended with the irrefutable but irrelevant argument
that nonoptimal discount rates result in inefficient resource
allocation in optimal growth market models. John Rawls surnma-
rized the case with an appropriate air of bemusement:
"Having started with the idea that the appropriate rate of
saving is the one which maximizes social utility over
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time, we may obtain a more plausible result if the
welfare of future generations is weighted less heavily.
What we are doing is adjusting certain parameters so as
to reach a conclusion more in line with our intuitive
judgements" (Rawls 1971).
But it is precisely this sort of "intuitive" tinkering
with the time stream evaluation assumptions which we cannot
afford. The practice cloaks vital social issues in a cloud of
empty and unnecessary rhetoric, allowing opinion to pass for
expertise and forcing expertise to pass as opinion. Selfserving
biases find ample latitude to creep into discount rate recommen-
dations, and once there are uncritically accorded the sanction
of scientific and economic respectability (c.f. the documentation
of of such occurences in the water resources field given by
Haveman, 1969). Pressing and relevant theoretical questions
fail to receive the attention they deserve, and grave misallo-
cations of resources - the one condition which the economic
rationale is designed to prevent - accrue unremarked and
persist unappreciated amidst the general confusion. Finally,
the apparent and in many cases real caprice of the resulting
"social" ､ ｩ ｾ ｣ ｯ ｵ ｮ ｴ rate decisions robs the entire project
evaluation exercise of much of its scientific and political
legitimacy (Lipset 1963). Alienated constituencies, rightly
distressed at what appears to be the undebatable but arbitrary
interjection of unsupported technical opinion into decisions
of great moral and political import, find little credibility
in the resulting project evaluations and recommendations. More
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often than not, the critical decisions regarding appropriate
time-stream aggregation assumptions are ultimately reduced to
exercises in rhetoric and political power: devoid of knowledge-
able content, inefficient in the extreme, and satisfying to no
one but the winners of the battle. [see, e.g. the controversy
over the third London airport (Mishan 1970), the u.s. Congress
Hearings on the PPBS system (U.S. Congress 1969), etc.]
We suspect that there are practical, defensible alternatives
to the present social time preference debacle. But these can
only be articulated through a critical examination of present
difficulties and questions, and a conscientious questioning of
even the most time- and tradition-honored presumptions when these
are found to be at variance with the realities and ethical pre-
cepts of the day.
We turn now to a manifestly incomplete and sketchy review
of some of the particular issues which it seems necessary to
address with regard to the time aggregation question.
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II. Constraints and Structure of the Social Time Preference
Problem
[This section as yet unwritten; see Feldstein 1964,
Koopmans 1967, and Keeney and Raiffa (Ch.9) 1975 for the
formal structure and constraints of the time preference problem] •
III. Uncertainty and Time Stream Evaluation
E. An Overview of Opinions
As noted at the outset, the essential unpredictability of
the future means that considerations of uncertainty (more pre-
cisely, risk, uncertainty, and surprise; see Clark and Swain
1975) are central to the time stream evaluation problem. All
of attitudes towards uncertainty can be found in the
theoretical and empirical literature. A brief sampling should
suffice to convey the disparity of outlooks.
In an early work McKean (1958, pg.64) held risk to be an
intangible, the resolution of which was best left to the "sphere
of judgement". Dorfman (1962), discussing just this matter,
found statistical decision theory not particularly applicable
to treatment of risk in a time stream evaluation context, but
nevertheless went on to describe several ways in which risks
might be evaluated.
In any event the notion of a "risk premium", drawn from
business decision making jargon, emerged in the late 1950s and
1960s. Its evolution in the U.S. federal bureaucracy is nicely
documented by Haveman (1969). Frost (1971) summarizes a common
attitude: "In practice, it is usually appropriate to adopt
approximately the bank rate for low discount projects and a
rather higher rate if the element of uncertainty is greater".
Just why this is appropriate and how high is "rather high" is
passed over with marked silence.
The "risk premium" concept became a catch-all for several
proposed "adjustments" to time streams of data almost as sbon
as it was introduced. Havemann (1965, App. B) suggested that
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on a presumption of risk aversion, present values of future
benefits should be adjusted down, but those of future costs up.
Further, the benefit adjustment should be greater than the cost
adjustment because of the presumed greater uncertainties in the
former.
Bain, Caves, and Margolis (1966), were not of this opinion,
arguing instead that
"the only general justification for introducing a 'risk
allowance' of one sort or another into investment calcu-
lations would be that some or all water agencies seem to
have shown a propensity to make unjustifiably optimistic
estimates of future benefits of projects; thus reducing
their estimates by such a means as increasing the rate of
discount by 2 or 3 percentage points would compensate for
their bias in estimating" (pg. 272).
More recently, Fisher and Krutilla (1974) have suggested
other modifications of the discount rate, viz. to account for
option-value risk costs (1974 pg. 104ff) and even to balance
out predicted trends in costs and demands (1975 pg. 360ff).
Finally, Hirshleifer and Shapiro (1969) preface an ex-
cellent discussion and summary of existing quantitative recom-
mendations for federal investment discount rates with the
following revealing reservations:
liThe figures are not fully comparable, since they were
made at varying dates in a period of changing conditions
in financial markets. Also, in some cases different
types of government decisions were under consideration,
so that the comparable private rates would not be expected
to be the same. Against all these should be kept in mind
the recommendation of some authors that the riskless rate
be used ••• However, it is clear that the figures here
include an adjustment for inflationary expectations; the
anticipated real riskless rate has probably been rather
steady •.. " (pg.517).
In light of all this, recall the rationalization upon
which a recommendation for market determination of time stream
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aggregations must be justified. From Fisher's 1930 Theory of
Interest:
"In such an ideal loan market, therefore, where every
individual could freely borrow or lend, the rates of
preference or impatience for present over future income
for all the different individuals would become, at the
margin, exactly equal to each other and to the rate of
interest" (Fisher 1930: pg. 106).
The uncertainty issue has clearly wrought havoc with this
attractive and elegant view of time preference determination.
To find out how and to what effect, it will be useful to explore
the various aspects of the uncertainty question in a bit more
detail.
F. States, Preferences, and Attitudes: Some Distinctions
Two sorts of basic uncertainty questions are particularly
relevant to the discussion of time stream problems. The first
concerns that a decision adopted to achieve some specified
result will not in fact do so. If I order my roast beef rare
in some of the nation's restaurants, there is a fair likelihood
it will arrive well-done. At issue .is a question of what state
or states of the world will in fact result from my decision to
specify rare roast. But there is a second sort of uncertainty
here as well, reflecting the fact that I'm not really sure that
its rare roast 1 1 11 want by the time my original decision has
taken effect and the roast arrived. I may, by then, want the
roast well done instead, or have seen the lobster ordered by my
colleague and want that rather than any sort of roast at all.
This is not a question of the physical effects of my decision,
but rather reflects the possible uncertainty of my preferences
at some future time effected by the decision. These two issues
of uncertain states of the world and uncertain preferences
among those states are discussed in turn in the following
sections. Regardless of which sort of uncertainty problem is
under consideration, however, an obvious but oft-ignored dis-
tinction must be made between the fact of uncertainty per se,
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and our attiudes towards that uncertainty (Hirshliefer and
Shapiro 1969).
This point is central to the modern view of utility theory,
and would not be worth making were it not so often missed in
applied evaluation studies. Uncertainty itself, most would
agree, is a fact of life. Thus we may be willing to quote the
chances that a given event will occur, when a statement that it
would (or would not) occur for certain would make no sense.
The "chance" estimates may be objectively determined or un-
abashedly sUbjective in nature. In either event, the expected
value notion lets us in some sense "aggregate" these uncertain-
ties, telling (for instance) the most likely mean result of
taking the same gamble repeatedly.
But given any estimate of the physical probabilities of a
set of outcomes, our attitudes towards those probabilities are
another matter altogether. Thus, given an offer of winning
$1000 for sure or taking a 50/50 gamble between $5000 won or
$2000 lost, it is perfectly plausible that I would take the
sure thing even though its expected value is $500 less than
that of the gamble. In such a case, I would be described as
"risk-averse", and the $500 differential would in some sense
represent the magnitude of my distaste for gambling: for me,
"certain" projects may be adopted over uncertain ones even when
the latter have expected values equivalent to the former.
The important point here is that attitudes towards un-
certainty - in the form of risk averse, risk prone, risk neutral,
or other more complex forms of decision rules (Dorfman 1962,
Chernoff 1954)- are potentially of the utmost importance in
project evaluation. Such attitudes must be explicitly assessed
or defined and reflect altogether different characteristics of
the evaluation problem than those relating to the assessment of
outcome state or preference probabilities per se. It is plausible,
for instance, that serious reflection might lead us to conclude
that the estimation of uncertainties states resulting from a
decision is largely a matter for the relevant experts; that
assumptions about future preferences should be approached with
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some fair humility, a fair amount of guidance from ethical/
political precepts, and due attention to poets, artists, and
sundry other future-perceptive neurotics (May )i and that
attitudes towards these respective uncertainties are empirical
issues to be determined through open and informed soci-political
dialog. We do not argue for or against these positions for the
moment, but raise them as illustrative of the sorts of distinc-
tions which must be made for a useful consideration of the time
problem. In any event, it should be clear that confounding the
estimation of uncertainty per se with the assessment of atti-
tudes towards uncertainty and risk taking is entirely without
theoretical or logical ｪ ｵ ｳ ｴ ｩ ｦ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｾ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｌ and can only serve to
further confuse an already difficult issue.
G. Uncertainty in Time Stream Projections (Working Notes)
Most of the literature on "risk" in time stream evaluation
problems concerns treatment of uncertainties in the "states of
nature ll likely to result from a specified decision. The rele-
vant arguments are noted here, with the less well developed
issue of uncertain preferences reserved for the following section.
1) Uncertainties regarding project outcomes exist and should be
dealt with in the evaluation process (Samuelson 1964). Project
promoters tend to equate target estimates with actual expected
performance values. (Bain, Caves, and Margolis 1966, quoted here
on pg. 9). This practice is obviously wrong and should be
guarded against. The appropriate response requires explicit
estimation of outcome probabilities, not inclusion of a IIgeneral",
"average", and meaningless correction factor (Bain, Caves and
Margolis 1966).
2) Uncertainties regarding project outcomes should be repre-
sented as probability distributions of particular outcomes,
given alternative decisions. If these distributions are functions
of time, they should be stated as such. Although such time
functions will occasionally be of a constant compounding form
(and thus look similar to a discount rate) this will not
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generally be the case. Fixed II r isk-premium ll additions to base
level discount rates are therefore generally inapplicable to
even single project evaluations. Because of the project - or
decision - specific nature of outcome probability distributions
across-the-board treatments of risk education are also inappro-
priate. Counter arguments (McKean 1958, Hirshleifer et ale 1960,
Joint Economic Committee 1968), are all based on a demonstrably
false contention that market behaviour is an adequate register
of social time preference opinions (Margl-in 1963, Feldstein 1964).
3) It follows that uncertainty in project outcomes, and attitudes
towards these uncertainties, should not be expressed implicitly
in the discoun"t parameter, common practice to the contrary (cf.
Hirshleifer and Shapiro 1959 pg. 515). One affirmitive voice is
that of Fred Hoffman as Asst. Director, BOB: 1I\'Jhile I certainly
do not wish to argue that government programs are riskless - on
the contrary, they are often subject to considerable risk. I
believe that better decisions are likely to result from considering
risks explicitly by adjusting the expected costs and benefits than
by attempting to relate the average risk of public programs and
'similarly risky' investments in the private sector". (in
Hirshleifer and Shapiro 1969).
4. A more serious argument questions the relevance of private
attitudes towards uncertainty, to the treatment of uncertainty
in evaluating public projects. This is generally posed in the
context of whether (individual) risk aversion represents a
public cost, but corresponding reasoning can be used for the
analysis of a more generally class of uncertainty attitudes.
Samuelson and Vickery (1964) crystalized the debate by sugges-
ting that since the governemnt invested in a large number of
projects, by the law of large numbers the expected outcome was
virtually certain. The government should therefore evaluate
projects on an expected value basis, ignoring the potential
risk-bearing cost of each individual project as socially irrel-
evant. Arrow and Lind (1970) develop similar arguments for a
perfect market model. But they alter their conclusions dramat-
ically for actual practice. They invoke the government as
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risk-spreader showing that [if the returns of any given investment
are independent of other investments then] public project risks
become insignificant if borne by a large enough public. But if
the risk-bearing in fact falls on private individuals, then their
risk attitudes should be taken into account in evaluation. It
would seem that many environmental impact and regional development
proposals might reasonably be viewed as impinging risky time
streams on just such private groups, even when the risky costs
of the project could be treated as publicly borne. Finally,
Fisher and Krutilla (1974) note that when Samuelson's (1954)
"public goods" are involved in the decision [i.e. goods for which
consumption by one individual does not change amount available
for the next], then the "pooling" or "spreading" arguments fail
and make sense: for "public goods" (Le. many environmental
attributes), risk-bearing cost of individuals should enter into
the evaluation process. This issue seems to stand in need of
review with specific respect to its bearing on environmental
and amenity impact problems. (sa. references in works cited,
plus review in Baumol 1969 pg. 794).
H. Uncertainty in Future Preferences (Working Notes)
1) We cannot know for certain what our state-of-nature prefer-
ences or attitudes towards risk will be in the future. This
presents an obvious problem for the evaluation of time streams,
even if the physical outcomes of project alternatives are known
for certain.
2) This uncertainty becomes relevant to the extent that decisions
taken now are reflected in time stream values in later periods.
To the extent that present decisions have low futurities and/or
are easily "reversible, the uncertainties regarding future pref-
erences will become less significant.
3) At one level, the uncertain preferences problem can be
dealt with via a probability distribution of future utilities.
This should be relatively straightforward conceptually if
difficult to assess in practice.
-15-
4) Under conditions of risk aversion, uncertainties of future
preferences will lead to a sort of "risk bearing cost" for the
present decision maker.
5) A very important additional consideration concerns the notion
of "option value". It is a central postulate of welfare economics
that an expansion of choice represents a welfare gain, whereas a
reduction represents a welfare loss. Irreversible decisions, or
those exceedingly difficult or costly to reverse, will entail a
loss of "option value" (Weisbrod 1964) and consequently of welfare.
The magnitude of this option value will depend upon the value of
resources necessary to restore the opportunity, and the duration
of time over which the opportunity is foregone. It is not clear
at present whether the option value loss is also dependent on the
likelihood of the option being desired, or whether the loss of
options should be counted a welfare cost even if no one wants to
use the option. Finally, it should be noted that decisions which
enrich opportunities should be assigned positive option values.
6) The irreversibility - option value - preference uncertainty
relationships seem likely to be exceedingly important in eval-
uating alternative development proposals, and have received ex-
ceedingly little attention in the literature. This disparity
should be addressed. Relevant comments are provided by Weisbrod
(1964), Koopmans (1964), Arrow and Fisher (1974), Fisher and
Krutilla (1974, 1975).
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IV. A Methodology for Intertemporal Indicator Evaluation
1.
Here we attempt to give a framework by which the problems
of tradeoffs over time may be handled. In this working paper
our aim is to get the general ideas down on paper, so much of
the background and details are left to the reader's imagination.
First, a brief review of current methods which involve
multiattribute analysis. We are aiming at a fairly high level
of sophistication and we feel that cost-benefit type analyses
which rely heavily on discounting and mysterious factors
can be omitted here. There are evidently tradeoffs to be made
in which analytical procedure to adopt for any given problem
and often a simple technique not only gets quicker results but
there is a smaller chance of making a fundamental error.
Recognising this but believing that there is a place for more
detailed analysis (see for example that by Bell (1975», we
adopt this more detailed approach.
Next we propose modifications of existing procedures to
handle uncertainty of future preferences. There are at least
three different ways in which this uncertainty can arise, due
to uncertainty with respect to how the physical situation (of
the world) will develop, due to a natural, but unknown, gradual
change in outlook of the individual with respect to those things
that concern him now, and thirdly due to new objectives and con-
siderations that were not known at the time (now) that the
analysis was performed. We leave out of this discussion the
question of ne\v physical factors arising that change the real
world surroundings. There is a growing literature on modelling
to take account of "surprises", see for example Holling (1973)
and Haefele (1975).
Then we discuss the questions of option foreclosure, inter-
generational tradeoffs and the general problems associated with
decisions in the public rather than private domain. We have
less to offer here in concrete terms but suggestions are made.
Finally we examine the question of resolving inconsistencies
-17-
that arise by considering separately long term and short term
issues.
J. The Current State of the Art
Given a set of objectives or attributes, x 1 , ••. ,xn a utility
function u(x 1 ' ••. ,xn ) possesses the property that for two un-
certain consequences ｾ and y, the decision maker prefers ｾ to y
if ｛ ｅ ｻ ｕ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ ｽ > E{U(y)}]. We will not go into it here but there
are independence assumptions which allow this utility function
to be assessed using only one or two dimensional marginal utility
functions, for details see Keeney and Raiffa (1976).
In particular, with respect to time streams Fishburn (1965),
Meyer (1970, 1976) and Bell (1975 a) have given assumptions which
allow simplified forms of the utility function, the simplest
expressing ｵ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ as a sum or product of one period utility functions:
or
T
ｵＨｾＩ = r ktut(xt )t=1
T
1 + ｫｵＨｾＩ = IT (1 + kktut(xt »t=1
(i)
( ii)
where the k, kt's are constants. See Meyer (1969) or Keeney
(1975a) for details.
It is worth mentioning how these kt's are assessed since
we will use it later. The procedure is virtually identical for
(i) and (ii) but we will show the harder case (ii). Utility
functions may be scaled with the worst possible outcome of
period t at 0 and the best at 1. Note the underline which
emphasizes that this best/worst consequence need not be constant
over time. Consider the question - "Suppose you are faced with
a time stream in which every consequence is at its worst level,
but that you could raise precisely one of these from worst to
best, which would you choose"?
Whatever the answer j1 say, we then find the second best, j2 and
so on. This shows that k j1 > k j2 > k j3 ....••..
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Now we ask if you must choose between a stream with all at their
worst except j1 which is at its best, or a lottery giving a
probability p at a stream with all at their best and 1-p at all
their worst which would you choose? Which value of p would make
you indifferent? The value of P, Pj1 say, is the value of k j1
This may be repeated for each index to obtain all the ki's
(though there are better ways). Now to find the remaining
constant k, solve
T
1 + k = IT (1 + kkt )t=1
which is the situation that (ii) gives if all consequences are
set at their best values.
Interpret the kt's as the relative value of the tth attribute.
Note,that u t does change if the range changes. If we make
the worst consequence in the tth period much worse then k
t
should rise.
K. Uncertainty of Future Preferences
One of the difficulties inherent with doing anything ana-
lytical with time stream preferences is that all of utility
theory is based on a single decision maker who knows his own
mind. The problem of establishing utility functions for groups
of people is largely unsolved precis because there is no
single decision maker (see Kirkwood (1972), Keeney (1975b)).
In our case our single decision maker does not know for sure
what will be his preferences next year, and occasionally
even tomorrow.
This uncertainty stems from three circumstances apart
from the short term reversibility of preference in the brain
These we will discuss in turn.
a) It depends what happens
For a time stream x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ' •.. ,x 10 •..•.• our preferences
for events in period 10 may depend on what happens in periods
1 - 9. An Englishman who has never been to the U.s. will not
care less who wins the World Series in period 0 but perhaps if
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he lives there during periods 1 - 9 he might care by period 10.
Of course he still may not, and it is this assumption that pre-
ferences for what happens in a given year do not depend on the
particular set of circumstances that preceded it, that is in-
corporated in models (i) and (ii). We allow that there is
considerable interest in the World Series in period 10 but none
in period 0 so long as that interest is independent of the
circumstances in periods 1 - 9. Thus models (i) and (ii) would
not be suitable for our example.
These extra complications can be handled by assessing larger
dimensional utility functions but this is undesirable if the
dimensions get above 2. Bell's formulation allows explicit
dependency up to k periods back and requires assessing k+1 dimen-
sional functions, so that k = 1 (or a sort of Markov property)
is the most that should be attempted unless other assumptions can
be found. Meyer (1976) has a promising idea of using "state
､ ･ ｳ ｣ ｲ ｩ ｰ ｴ ｯ ｲ ｾ Ｂ an idea similar to that of sufficient statistics,
to describe the salient features of the events in the past. One
such state descriptor for our example might be SD = Number of
years spent in the U.S.
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b) ｑ ｮ ･ Ｇ ｳ ｟ ｾ ｩ ･ ｷ ｳ ｾ ｩ ｧ ｨ ｴ change
As time goes by it may be that although our views concerning
the relative merits of our objectives do change according to how
things develop, they may also change due to external factors,
incidents that weren't anticipated and so on. We can anticipate
now that that will happen, but what should we do about it?
Consider model (ii) and suppose that u 1 (x 1 ) the utility for the
first period is a function of s attributes x 1 = (x 11 , ••. ,x1s),
and that uT(xT) is also a function of the same attributes
xT = (XT1 ' •.• 'XTS ). For simplicity suppose that uT(xT) is
independent of the preceding history X1 ' ••• ,XT- 1 .
The function u T is uncertain, so suppose we assess a
probability distribution over all possible uT's perhaps indexed
by a parameter S say. So UT(S,XT) is the utility function
with probability density p(S) (see Kirkwood (1974». Suppose
that, given S, the worst consequence is ｸ ｾ Ｈ ｓ Ｉ and the best
*x T (9) and that
Interpret the situation as follows. Suppose the probability
density is discrete with two non-zero points So and S1. With
probabilityp(SO) at time T you will be in mind uT(SO,xT) and
with probability P(S1) = 1 - peSO) you will be in mirtd u T (S1'xT).
Suppose further that peSO) = P(S1) = 1/2.
At time zero (now) you may choose between two options
either
0
*xT(So) if S = So and x T (S1 ) if S = S1
or
*
0
xT(SO) if S = So and x T (S1 ) if S = S1
(iii)
(iv)
Which do you prefer? Say the former for example. Now we ask,
given the second alternative (iv) for sure or a (p,1-p) lottery
between (iii) and
1/3 chance at the option
o 0{xT (8 0 ), xT (8 1)}, and so
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ｘ ｾ Ｈ Ｘ Ｐ Ｉ if 8 = 80 and ｘ ｾ Ｈ Ｘ Ｑ Ｉ if 8 = 8 1 (v)
What value of p would make you indifferent? Call it PO'
Now suppose P(8 0 ) 1 p(8 1), in particular suppose that pCSO) = 2/3
and p(8 1) = 1/3, and that Po = 1/2. Given these new circum-
stances, what should be the preferred option between (iii) and
(iv)?
Each represents, effectively, a
o *{XT (8 0 ), x T (8 1 )} and a 2/3 chance at
indifference should hold.
If the relevant independence properties hold regarding
preferences for x T given 80 with respect to values of xT given
8 1 and vice versa we may assume one of the model
(viii)
(ix)
where k(8) are the weights obtained in the fashion of PO' p (8)
is the probability distribution of 8 and
* *1 + k = TI(1+k K(8)p(8»
8
As a simple example suppose that x T is a scalar and
-8xT
uT (8,xT) = -e
-r8
and that p(8) = reO < 8 < 00
k(8) = 1 and we use model (viii). Then straight-
forwardly we get
-22-
c) A new objective may arise
.In the process of creating a utility function one goes
through the identification of objectives and creates a number
attributes x 1 ' ... 'xs accordingly. But suppose by the time
period T comes around there are new objectives x +l' ..• 'x*.s s
What then? (We need not worry about objectives which lose their
importance, that is covered in section b) above).
For simplicity suppose that uT(x,y) has only two attributes
only one of which, x, is explicitly recognised at time zero.
Suppose that, had we known of y we could have established that
one of the forms
lIT (x,y) == k 1u
1 (x) + k 2u
2 (y)
or
1 21 + kuT(x,y) == (1 +kk 1u (x» (1 + kk2u (y»
was appropriate. Suppose also that the probability density
function p(x,y) of an occourence (x,y) (taken from the physical
model) is separable i.e. p(x,y) == P1 (x)P2(y), then the criterion
by which we judge events, namely the expected utility is
JUT(X,y)P(X,y)dXdY == fk 1U 1(x)P1 (x)dx + Ik2U2 (y)P2(y)dY
== Jk1U
1 (x)P1 (x)dx + k 2c
The other case is
(x)
1(1 + kuT(x,y»p(x,y)dxdy == (1 + kk 2C) f (1 + kk 1u 1 (x»P1 (x)dx
(xi)
where c == E{U2 (y)} ｾ 1.
From these we can see that a useful approximation to uT(x,y)
is given in each case by a functional form au 1 (x) + B where in
case (x)
a == 1
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and in case (xi)
S = k c2
Notice that if models (i) and (x) are used together or if (ii)
and (xi) are used together (both additive and both multiplicative)
then this missing objective aspect can be ignored. Otherwise
this effect acts as a weighting factor which reduces the ｩ ｭ ｮ ｯ ｾ ﾭ
tance of x. We have ignored in this draft the question of how the
estimate kT in (i) or (ii) is affected by the presence or
absence of y.
L. Option Foreclosure
A concern ,with regard to decision making which has impacts
over time is that future circumstances, or preferences may
determine that the current decision was not only "wrong" but
also has prevented anything being done to correct things.
Building a dam on a site of historical interest and beauty may
be "correct" now with today's concerns and preferences, but in
10 years time all may be changed and there is no reversibility.
(For further examples see Walters (1975)).
If the methods of the last section on "Uncertainty of
Preferences" is applicable then the question of option fore-
closure can be handled. The difficulty of course lies in
getting a satisfactory priori over future preferences and from
a modelling point of ｶ ｩ ･ ｾ for events. There ｳ ･ ･ ｾ ｳ no way of
planning for completely unexpected events, (cf. Bell and Clark
(1976)), other than by having a very diffuse ｰ ｲ ｩ ｯ ｾ
M. Integenerational Tradeoffs
Throughout this discussion of methodological techniques
we have referred to period T in the future, and impliciately
assumed that the concerns of that time were with respect to the
same individual who now considers them. Suppose that T is
expressed in terms of generations, or centuries or millenia
Using the techniques of uncertain preferences we can see that
the tendency would be for us to exercise extreme caution -
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unless we weigh their preferences quite lowly, that is, have
k T very small.
This is done in practice for the pragmatic reason that ｾ ･
would never use another sack of coal or barrel of oil again,
and this is not only intolerable but evidently not the way
things need to be. We are trying here however to establish a
methodology by constructive means rather than by empiricism.
There is certainly an argument on moral grounds to have
k T = k 1 and if we think in terms of per capita value perhaps
k T should be related to the population, in which case we would
eventually have k T much larger.
Though our analysis has not been detailed (or careful:) we
feel that the last paragraph is sound and practical. We still
arrive at the same conclusions but through section b) in the
"Uncertainty of Preferences" section, that we weigh future
generations less because of the uncertainty we have concerning
their likes and dislikes, however because we include a wide
range of utility functions as possibilities, decisions now that
have an extreme effect on the future will be weighted negatively
and heavily.
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